"'I'll make old vases for you if you want them—will make them just as I made these.' He had visions of a room full of golden brown beard. It was the most appalling thing he had ever witnessed, and there was no trickery about it. The beard had actually grown before his eyes, and it had now reached to the second button of the Clockwork man's waistcoat. And, at any moment, Mrs. Masters might return! "Worth stealing," a Society journalist lounging by remarked. "I could write a novel, only I can never think of a plot. Your old housekeeper is asleep long ago. Where do you carry your latchkey?" "Never lose your temper," he said. "It leads to apoplexy. Ah, my fine madam, you thought to pinch me, but I have pinched you instead." How does that strike you, Mr. Smith? Fancy Jerusha Abbott, (individually) ever pat me on the head, Daddy? I don't believe so-- The confusion was partly inherited from Aristotle. When discussing the psychology of that philosopher, we showed that his active Nous is no other than the idea of which we are at any moment actually conscious. Our own reason is the passive Nous, whose identity is lost in the multiplicity of objects with which it becomes identified in turn. But Aristotle was careful not to let the personality of God, or the supreme Nous, be endangered by resolving it into the totality of substantial forms which constitute Nature. God is self-conscious in the strictest sense. He thinks nothing but himself. Again, the subjective starting-point of305 Plotinus may have affected his conception of the universal Nous. A single individual may isolate himself from his fellows in so far as he is a sentient being; he cannot do so in so far as he is a rational being. His reason always addresses itself to the reason of some one else—a fact nowhere brought out so clearly as in the dialectic philosophy of Socrates and Plato. Then, when an agreement has been established, their minds, before so sharply divided, seem to be, after all, only different personifications of the same universal spirit. Hence reason, no less than its objects, comes to be conceived as both many and one. And this synthesis of contradictories meets us in modern German as well as in ancient Greek philosophy. 216 "I shall be mighty glad when we git this outfit to Chattanoogy," sighed Si. "I'm gittin' older every minute that I have 'em on my hands." "What was his name?" inquired Monty Scruggs. "Wot's worth while?" "Rose, Rose—my dear, my liddle dear—you d?an't mean——" "I'm out of practice, or I shouldn't have skinned myself like this—ah, here's Coalbran's trap. Perhaps he'll give you a lift, ma'am, into Peasmarsh." Chapter 18 "The Fair-pl?ace." "Yes," replied Black Jack, "here they are," drawing a parchment from his pocket. "This is the handwriting of a retainer called Oakley." HoME大桥未久AV手机在线观看 ENTER NUMBET 0016www.hlcitq.com.cn
Beneficence, determinism and justice: an engagement
with the argument for the genetic selection of intelligence
by
Birch K.
Department of Planning, Gipsy Lane,
Oxford Brookes University,
OX3 0BB, UK.
kbirch@brookes.ac.uk
Bioethics. 2005 Feb;19(1):12-28.
ABSTRACTIn 2001, Julian Savulescu wrote an article entitled 'Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children', in which he argued for the genetic selection of intelligence in children. That article contributes to a debate on whether genetic research on intelligence should be undertaken at all and, if so, should intelligence selection be available to potential parents. As such, the question of intelligence selection relates to wider issues concerning the genetic determinism of behavioural traits, i.e. alcoholism. This article is designed as an engagement in the intelligence selection debate using an analysis of Savulescu's arguments to raise a series of problematic issues in relation to the ethics of parental selection of intelligence. These problematic issues relate to wider assumptions that are made in order to put forward intelligence selection as a viable ethical option. Such assumptions are more generic in character, but still relate to Savulescu's article, concerning issues of genetic determinism, private allocation and inequality, and, finally, individual versus aggregate justice. The conclusion focuses on what the implications are for the question of agency, especially if intelligence selection is allowed.Biohappiness
Genospirituality
Julian Savulescu
Private eugenics
'Designer babies'
Procreative liberty
Personal genomics
Genetic enhancement
Ashkenazi intelligence
Eugenics before Galton
Scandanavian eugenics
The literature of eugenics
Human self-domestication
Germline genetic engineering
Preimplantation genetic diagnosis
A life without pain? Hedonists take note'
'The Principle of Procreative Beneficence'
Francis Galton and contemporary eugenics
Gene therapy and performance enhancement
Principle of Procreative Beneficence vs Acceptable Suffering?
Refs
and further readingHOME
Resources
Wireheading
BLTC Research
cognitive-enhancers.com
Superhappiness?
Utopian Surgery?
The Good Drug Guide
The Abolitionist Project
The Hedonistic Imperative
The Reproductive Revolution
MDMA: Utopian Pharmacology
Critique of Huxley's Brave New World